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THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN ITS RELATIONS TO REALISM AND SENSATIONALISM.

READ AT THE CONCORD SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY, AUGUST 3, 1881, BY JOHN WATSON.

A philosophy must not be regarded as less perfect than another because it has less of consistency within itself. There is such a thing as the weakness of one's strength. A man who is not afflicted with a strong and energetic nature will not very readily leave the beaten track for devious courses, but, on the other hand, he will as certainly not lead others into fresh fields and pastures new. A man or a philosophy is to be judged by a standard other than that of its mere external completeness. As time goes on the world becomes for the thinker much more complicated, and therefore he who tries to make a conception, which was adequate enough when the world was less complex, do under the altered condition of things, will produce a system apparently adequate, because of its very inadequacy. To Parmenides pure being seemed sufficient as a formulation of the universe, but to whom does that notion appear sufficient now? Not even to Mr. Spencer, prone as that thinker is to rest satisfied with categories of exceeding simplicity. We shall, then, judge unfairly of any philosophy, and especially of the philosophy of Kant, if we endeavor to estimate it by the somewhat external standard of self-consistency. No doubt such a

method of looking at a system has its own value; for a philosophy which is hopelessly illogical—I mean one which is incoherent within itself—is, in all probability, at the same time hopelessly inadequate. But there is something much higher than mere consistency between parts; there is that noble sort of inconsistency—the inconsistency of genius—which arises from the fierce struggle between the new and the old. Of want of development in the system of Kant there is enough and to spare; but there is not less evidence of an insight into the infinite complexity of the modern world, which is only seen by the man of genius, or seen by others when time has made it clear. To appreciate Kant we must therefore view him as the exponent of a new synthesis, and not simply as giving a new solution of the same old problem. The problem given to Aristotle to solve, he solved for all time; but he did not solve the problem of Kant, for Kant's problem implied the intermediation of Christianity and the changed aspect of the modern world, which followed in the train of Christianity.

Kant, it has been said, is constantly asserting that metaphysics are independent of the teaching of experience, and that they must not call in experience. That to a verbal critic of Kant this should seem a fair representation of his teaching is intelligible enough, but it is hard to believe that any one who has once clearly realized what Kant's problem was, and how he tried to solve it, should put the matter in this way. Idealism does not spin the universe out of the individual consciousness, or construct the world independently of facts. Idealism, in any sense in which it is held outside of a lunatic asylum, does not deny that we know real objects, nor does it assert that objects are dependent on the individual consciousness of any man, or of all men; on the contrary, it affirms as emphatically as the realist that there is a real world, and that this world is not constructed by the individual mind. The idealist takes exception, not to the facts of experience, whether these concern the world of nature or the world of mind, but to a realism which assumes a world existing independently of intelligence, and to a sensationalism which explains the world as the product of association acting upon the particular and evanescent feelings of the individual man. To the first idealism replies that a real world, existing independently of all intelligence, is a world that by definition cannot be known, and therefore cannot be known to exist.

Such a world, even granting it to be real, can only be thought of as an unknown something mysteriously operating upon a mind that is shut out from any direct relation to it. Realism, in fact, leads to agnosticism. For, when we attempt to explain how a self-dependent world comes to be known, we are compelled to acknowledge that all that gives definiteness to it, all the properties by which it is known, exist only in relation to a being that thinks, as distinguished from a being that simply feels. The world as known being thus resolved into intelligible relations, the world as it is supposed to exist beyond knowledge is necessarily deprived of all motion, change, and life, and only survives as a ghostly thing in itself, indistinguishable from the Spencerian Unknowable. Realism can only save itself from this fate by becoming assumptive and dogmatical; it can but asseverate, as loudly as possible: "There is a real world, and we all know it!" Who denies the truism? The question is not, whether there *is* a real world—a fact which admits of no dispute among sane people—but what the *nature* of this real world is. Is it independent of intelligence, or is it not? This is the question, and, until the necessity for putting it has been clearly perceived, we may have a robust dogmatism, but we cannot, properly speaking, have a philosophy.

Kant did not deny the facts of experience. Like all philosophers, he began with the world of experience, as it exists for the unphilosophical man, and the problem he aimed to solve was: What are the intellectual elements which must be presupposed in order to a complete and adequate explanation of experience? His method was in essence identical with that of the scientific discoverer when, assuming certain facts as given to him, he asks what hypothesis will account for them in their completeness. There is, in truth, more reason for objecting to Kant that he was too ready to assume the facts of experience than for asserting that he set up a theory independently of them. For Kant looks too much at the world of experience as a ready-made material, which must indeed be described and explained, but the several parts of which do not admit of interconnection among themselves. The world of experience means for him the world as it exists for the reflective thinker of modern times, who has not only a practical acquaintance with men and things, but is also tolerably familiar with the results of scientific discovery. Before him lies this world

in its bold outlines; objects spread out in space, and events following on each other in time; things as extensive and intensive *quanta*; substances as changing, as connected in the way of cause and effect, and as acting and reacting upon each other. These elements he takes up very much as they stand, and assumes, without hesitation, that the broad distinctions that seem to divide them from each other are absolute. Space and time belong to one sphere, sensations as they occur in the individual mind to another sphere, categories of quantity and quality, of relation and modality, to a third, and distinct from all is the one universal self-consciousness. Moreover, even within these separate circles of existence, Kant finds abstract separations. Space has no bond of connection with Time, except that both belong to the one world of fact; sensations form a single series within a separate individual mind; quantity is apart from quality, substance from cause, and reciprocity from both. But, analytic or separative as Kant has a tendency to be, he cannot be accused of neglecting the world of experience in its broad and essential features. The world he deals with is the real world, and he never dreams for a moment of philosophizing without perpetual reference to it. If he fails to explain it thoroughly, this was only what was to be expected of a pioneer in a new and untrodden realm, and what, it may be added, must, more or less, be true of any theory that attempts to formulate the infinite variety of existence. To charge Kant with "overriding" or "mutilating the facts," is to talk at random. The facts are simple enough. But "facts" do not constitute a philosophy. No amount of ingenuity can extort from the command, "Stick to the facts," a single philosophical principle, and it is misleading to talk as if there were some cabalistic virtue in the use of an empty formula. "Certainly, we must keep to the facts," Kant would have replied, "but the point is, how you are going to explain them. Here they are, and we are all pretty well agreed about them! There are objects in space and time, there are individual feelings, there are things apparently, if not really, connected together; now, How do you *interpret* these facts?" "It is a fact," remarks the realist, "that the world is independent of consciousness." "Excuse me!" we can imagine Kant replying; "you are now confusing individual and universal consciousness, and, under disguise of that confusion, making the facts give a

theory of themselves. What we actually know is a world of objects in space and time, not a world independent of thought. Now, the problem of philosophy is to explain how we come to know that world."

The source of the realist's mistake is not far to seek. No attempt to account for experience can be made until experience has been well developed, and then we are apt to substitute a mere repetition of the facts for an explanation of them. Such a method, besides explaining nothing, is incidentally a perversion. Common sense neither affirms that real objects are independent of intelligence, nor, on the contrary, that they are dependent on intelligence; it simply affirms nothing whatever about the matter. If interrogated, and asked whether he believes the world to be independent of the mind, no doubt the "plain" man, when he once gets a glimpse of what is meant, will answer: "The world is certainly independent of the mind." But what he means to affirm is merely that the world does not come into being when he awakes, and is not annihilated when he goes to sleep. The realist, having extracted a reply that has no proper bearing upon the problem of philosophy, parades it as a "universal deliverance of common sense," a "fact of consciousness," a "fundamental belief." Now these, and many other high-sounding platitudes, well suited to catch "the ears of the groundlings," really amount to nothing but a misstatement of the point at issue. The realist gets the suffrages of common sense by asking a question not worth asking, and he triumphs over his idealistic opponent by the easy method of asserting what is not denied, and neglecting what is asserted. When it is affirmed that the world only exists in relation to intelligence, it is no answer to say that it exists independently of any individual consciousness. The difference between these two views is simply infinite, and, by confusing the one with the other, the realist but fights with a phantom of his own creation. The truth is, that to refer the matter to common sense at all is just as absurd as for a scientific man to appeal from the judgment of his compeers to the mere layman in science. No valuable answer can be obtained from those who have to be plied with leading questions before the answer desired is wrung from them. The idealist, it should be remembered, was at one time a "plain" man himself, and the "plain" man, if sufficiently instructed, might easily become

an idealist. It is surely time that this foolish appeal to the "vulgar" should be given up. But, if the question is to be referred to the common sense of men at all, it ought to be put in a way to be understood, and the only fair way to represent the issue is to ask: Does the world exist apart from an Infinite Intelligence? The only real objection to this form of the question is that it anticipates the result of a speculative philosophy; but, as the ordinary man cares only for the results of speculation, not for speculation itself, this mode of stating the problem is the fairest that, under the circumstances, is available.

Kant's problem was: What are the essential conditions of any knowledge whatever of real things? More particularly, How are we to explain the fact of a world in space and time—a world whose objects possess quantity and quality, and are connected together by the real or apparent bonds of causality and reciprocity? These were his facts. Now, the difficulty attending the solution of this problem was greatly lessened for Kant by the labors of his predecessors, especially Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. The last especially had virtually proved that the true explanation cannot be found in a theory that starts from the absolute opposition of thought and nature. Locke, like Dr. Reid, began with this misinterpretation of the facts. It seemed clear to him that the world was independent of his individual consciousness, and this he interpreted to mean that the world is an independent, self-complete object. The question of philosophy, as Locke figured it to himself, was: How am I, an individual man, confined to the succession of my own mental states, to get a knowledge of a world lying outside of me? Put in this way, the question is insoluble. If the world is a thing apart by itself, and I am shut up within my own individual mind, I can never get a knowledge of the world at all. That this was hidden from Locke, as it is still hidden from his sensationalistic followers, is due to the fact that the theory is not consistently carried out to its last results. Locke was a man of great vigor of mind, but he was very far from being a consistent thinker. Philosophical consistency demands that a theory should not only harmonize in all its parts, but should borrow nothing from the fact to be explained. Locke's system satisfies neither the one requirement nor the other. In borrowing from the world of experience to clothe the nakedness of his theory, Locke is a flagrant sinner.

He pretends to prove that from "simple ideas"—in plain words, from unrelated, particular sensations—we can account for the actual experience we undoubtedly possess. But nothing is plainer than that, when we consistently exclude all that is not sensation—when we do not allow ourselves to take advantage of relations of thought—we cannot get beyond the passing states of our own sentient nature. A consistent sensationalism may account for the unconscious sequence of sensations in the mere animal, but it utterly fails to explain a world of objects as experienced by a self-conscious being such as man. In bridging over the gulf between the mere series of feelings and the actual world as known, Locke attributes to sensation what only exists for thought. Sensations of touch he identifies with the conception of extended and solid bodies, and space he explains as the interval between bodies. By this conversion of sensation into its opposite, the difficulty of getting beyond the fragmentary sensations in the individual mind is concealed. Need it be pointed out that the explanation is plausible only because it assumes what it has to account for? Keep to a simple series of sensations, and you cannot get more than that simple series. By no amount of intellectual contortion can a mere sensation be identified with the quality of a real object, an aggregate of sensations with an object having various properties, or any association of such aggregates with a world of objects. Besides being inconsistent in borrowing from experience what he supposes himself to be explaining, Locke is also inconsistent in introducing elements that are only in place in a philosophy that recognizes the constitutive activity of intelligence. These elements, if developed, might, no doubt, lead to a true explanation of reality. But in Locke they are not developed, but simply put side by side with other elements inconsistent with them; and, if they were developed, the sensationalistic basis of his theory would have to go.

Hume was much more consistent than Locke, but even he, endowed as he was with a philosophical capacity probably unsurpassed, could not make bricks without straw. The ideal of sensationalism, which he rightly sees admits of nothing but feelings as originally felt or as reproduced in a fainter form, he is compelled quietly to abandon, from his inability to account even for the fiction of a real world. No doubt, as Dr. Stirling points out, Hume started from the facts of experience as they exist for us

all; a world of objects in space and time, with relations of quantity and quality, and apparently connected by the bond of cause and effect. But Dr. Stirling does not, as it seems to me, sufficiently distinguish between Hume's theory and the unwarranted assumptions he is led to make in trying to give it plausibility. It is no doubt true that, in speaking of causality, Hume "*did*" mean a really necessary connection, though . . . he *philosophically* could find no origin for it but the customary experience of constant conjunction." But it is under this very notion of "constant conjunction" that Hume slips in one of the most unwarrantable assumptions in the whole of his theory. If we grant "constant conjunction" to him, we allow him everything he needs. The real difficulty goes farther back, leading us to ask how—defining sensations as "perishable passions," and ostensibly allowing nothing but transient feelings, felt for the first time or repeated in a fainter form—Hume can get a "customary experience" or a "constant conjunction" at all. If the mind, as he asserts, is not different from the series of feelings, and if the object is to be resolved into that series, what is there to connect the feelings in a uniform order, or, indeed, in any order whatever? Unable to explain the permanence and causal connection of things from a number of scattered and unrelated feelings, Hume has to adopt the tactics of Locke, and to borrow from experience what he ought to explain. It is in this way that experience is apparently resolved into a stream of feelings, in defiance of the palpable fact that experience is not a stream of feelings. Still, Hume had at last brought the method of Locke to a tolerably clear consciousness of itself, and, in doing so, had indicated generally wherein its weakness lay. Kant was quick to perceive the source of that weakness, and, because he did so, he found his great problem: What are the elements necessary to account for real experience? a soluble one.

The simplest point of view from which the world of experience may be contemplated—and this is the fact to be explained—is that of a number of objects existing side by side in space, and a number of feelings in the individual mind following upon each other in time. What is the relation of the objects to the feelings? The first superficial answer naturally is, that the objects exist apart from the feelings, and, by acting upon the mind, give

rise to them. But this brings up a new difficulty. If the object exists independently, how is it known to exist? "Through the sensations it produces," it may be answered. We do not, then, know the object as it is in itself, but only as it is revealed in our sensations? "No." But, if we are confined to our own sensations, why should we assert the existence of anything distinct from them? "We cannot tell *what* the object is," answers the Spencerian, "but we can tell *that* it is, since we know it as an effect." But you can not know it to be an effect, objects Hume, without bringing the sensations under relations of thought, and, to do so, is to go beyond sensations. The relation of cause and effect cannot for us mean a relation in independent objects, because these are not known by us, upon your own showing; cause and effect, in fact, can only be for us some sort of association of feelings. We must, then, concludes Hume, discard the fiction of real objects and confine ourselves to that series of feelings which alone is knowable by us. Now, it is at this point that Kant joins issue with Hume. The latter, discarding all reality except that implied in the immediate consciousness of feelings, yet speaks of these as a series. But, objects Kant, feelings do not of themselves form a series, for succession implies Time, and apart from the connection of feelings there can be no consciousness of Time. And, even supposing feelings to constitute a series, that would not account for the coexistence of objects in Space, in which the parts do not follow each other, but exist all at once. Sensations, as merely particular or separate, cannot be formed into objects in space and time, each of which is a combination of properties, while all exist together in one space and one time. We may regard sensations as the unformed materials out of which objects are put together by a power higher than themselves, but in themselves they are not identical with objects, because in themselves they are not knowable at all. A being who had only a number of disconnected feelings could by no possibility have a consciousness of objects as they exist in our intelligent experience. The supposition that by sensation alone a knowledge of real objects is possible arises from a confusion between sensible *objects* and pure *sensations*. We speak of "sensible things" and the "sensible world," and for the ordinary purposes of every-day life our language is accurate enough. But when, by a confusion of thought, we transfer what

is true of the sensible thing to mere sensation, we fall into the gross mistake of affirming of unrelated feelings what is true only of related feelings—*i. e.*, of objects as they exist in our intelligent experience; we forget that the so-called “sensible” world is really an intelligible world. But if we hold tenaciously by what Hume has shown to be the character of sensation—*viz.* : a “perishable passion”—we at once see that objects in space and time are not resolvable into a mere multiplicity of sensations. It is because sensationalism, while pretending to account for our actual experience of objects from sensations alone, yet introduces elements foreign to sensation, that it is enabled to give a plausible explanation of a real world of objects in space and time. We must therefore insist upon the fact that sensations in themselves are a mere multiplicity, or, in other words, are not related to each other even as successive, far less as permanent and coexistent.

Sensations being definable as a pure multiplicity, which can only be reduced to unity by something different from themselves, it is absurd to suppose that they give a knowledge of real objects. They form an *element* in knowledge, not a separate *kind* of knowledge. The supposition that by pure sensations objects may be known, is partly due to the false assumption that Space and Time are independent objects immediately apprehensible by sense. And, certainly, if we hold with the realist that the real world is altogether independent of consciousness, we must suppose Space and Time to be independent objects in which other objects are arranged. Such a supposition, however, contradicts itself by destroying the very thing it sets out to explain. If Space and Time are real objects, existing apart from consciousness, how do we come to know them at all? It must be through our sensations, which we judge to be produced by them. Then, we do not know the real Space and the real Time, but only Space and Time as they appear to us. Thus we are brought round once more to the Spencerian point of view. But we cannot rest here. If we are shut up within our separate consciousness, and directly know only our own sensations, what right have we to assert that there is any Space and Time except that which is given in our sensations? We have no right whatever, and are thus driven to the view of Hume, that Space and Time are objects only in the sense of being somehow the product of sensation. But a pure sensationalism, as Kant

shows, cannot account even for the apparent reality of Space and Time. A sensation cannot be determined as "here" without being referred to something other than itself, in contrast to which its transience is perceived. To go beyond our immediate sensations, and refer them to objects in Space, is only possible to a being that is much more than a thread of sensations. So we cannot be conscious that "now" there is a sensation without going beyond the mere "now," the passing feeling, and connecting it with other feelings before and after. We suppose that sensations in themselves are located in space, and determined in time, because we forget that, when we contrast our feelings as transient with objects as permanent, we are already beyond mere feeling, and have effected the transformation of particular states of consciousness into real objects. And this just means that we are not selfless animals, but self-conscious men. An animal, with its mere flux of sensations, cannot locate *objects* in space, or place *events* in relation to each other in time, because it does not go beyond the disconnected impressions that serve it in lieu of intelligence; or, at any rate, if animals do arrange objects in space and time, they must be conscious beings.

Space and Time, then, are not independent objects, lying beyond intelligence, nor are they due to sensations. The only other hypothesis conceivable is, that they are in some sense contributed by the mind. Kant's view is that they belong to man as a perceptive being; in other words, that they are not abstract conceptions, but definite individuals. There are not several distinct spaces and times capable of being brought under an abstract conception different from each of them; there is only one Space, of which each space is an integral part, and one Time, in which each time is a particular unit. It must be observed, however, that, considered in themselves, Space and Time are not capable of being known, and therefore are not capable of accounting for our experience of them. Nor, even in conjunction with the material of sense—*i. e.*, with unrelated sensations—do they account for external objects as we know them in our developed experience. *Without* them, there could be no consciousness even of sensations, and therefore no consciousness of objects, as in space and time; but it does not follow that even *with* them a knowledge of real objects is possible. They are the perceptive conditions of such a knowledge, but they

are no more. Hence we may call them *forms* of perception. By "forms" we must not understand that Space and Time are pre-existent moulds in which objects are arranged, but simply that they are the essential conditions, without which there could be no perception of objects as existing side by side, or of feelings as following on each other. We are now entitled to say, then, that objects as existing in space and time can not be explained without presupposition of the multiplicity of sense, and of the perceptive forms of Space and Time.

This view of Space and Time as not objects that can be directly apprehended, or that exist apart from their relation to consciousness, begins that transformation of current notions which is the result of every earnest effort to explain the facts of experience. To those who speak of objects as independent of intelligence, Kant's reply is that they confuse externality *in space* with externality to *thought*. Real things are certainly "external" in the sense of being arranged in relation to each other in space; our sensations are certainly "internal" in so far as they are arranged as successive or coexistent events in time; but objects are not external in the sense of being *without intelligence*, nor are feelings internal because they alone are *within intelligence*. "External" and "internal" could have no meaning to a being destitute of intelligence, and hence to speak of objects that are external to intelligence is pure nonsense. I call a thing external either because I perceive it to stand apart from another thing, or to stand apart from my organism, and in both cases I am speaking of externality in the sense of position in space, not in the sense of independence of consciousness. I say my feelings are internal, because they are not made up of parts that stand out of each other, and because two feelings do not stand apart from each other like two objects in space; in other words, my feelings are internal because they are not in space, but only in time. But, although I distinguish in consciousness objects as external from feelings as internal, the objects and the feelings alike exist only for me as a conscious being. What Kant proves, then, is, that Space and Time exist only in relation to intelligence; or, otherwise, that the opposition of external objects to internal feelings is a logical distinction within consciousness, not a real separation without consciousness.

It may serve to illustrate what has just been said if we con-

sider that the distinction of qualities of body as "primary" and "secondary" in no way affects the Kantian explanation of the nature of space and time. A primary quality, according to Locke, is a property of objects in themselves, a secondary quality a property in us, or, more properly, an affection of our sensitive organism. This distinction only seems to bear upon the question of the relation of the inner to the outer world, because objects with their properties are opposed, not merely to the organism with its affections, but to consciousness itself. But this is to confuse objects as existing in space with objects as independent of consciousness. It is inferred that objects with their properties are independent of intelligence—in Kantian language, are things in themselves—because they stand apart from our bodies in space, and that the affections of the organism are alone in consciousness, because, as sensations, they are not in space, but only in time. Now, here there is a double confusion. In the first place, it is supposed that, because the primary properties belong to things external to the body, they are therefore external to, or independent of, consciousness; and, on the other hand, it is assumed that, because the affections of the organism are as sensations internal in the sense of being in time, they alone are included within consciousness. This opposition rests upon the confusion already pointed out between objects without the body and objects without consciousness. But these two meanings of externality, so far from being identical, are diametrically opposed to each other. An object in space is knowable because special distinctions exist only in relation to consciousness; an object beyond consciousness, as unknowable, is out of relation to consciousness. In other words, the contrast of things in space is relative to the contrast of feelings in time. A similar remark applies to the affections of the organism regarded as sensations of the subject. The fact that they are internal in the sense of being in time does not make them internal in the other sense of being independent of real things. Feelings as only in time are no more in consciousness than objects in space, since the distinction of outer and inner is a distinction within and not without consciousness. In the second place, the primary qualities are not purely external, nor are the secondary qualities purely internal. The property of an object is not only in space, but also in time, and an affection of the organism, viewed

on the outer side, is in space just as much as the quality of an extra-organic body. The organism, in short, may be viewed as an object in space, and the bodies lying apart from the organism do not exist out of time. This second mistake of Locke is, however, of less importance than the first, and, in fact, is only worth pointing out because it gives color to the view that consciousness is confined within the material organism, like a bird within the bars of its cage. But this view is seen to rest upon a false analogy of consciousness and material things, when it is remembered that the limits within which consciousness is supposed to be confined are really limits constructed by consciousness itself in the logical separation of internal and external existence.

Space and Time, we may now assume, are not objects independent of intelligence, nor, indeed, are they objects in any sense; they are simply the essential conditions of the perception of objects. Without them there could be no experience of external and internal objects, but even with them there could be no real experience. The pure forms of Space and Time, together with the separate sensations to be arranged under them, are but the perceptive element implied in a full act of knowledge. The unconnected sensations must be combined, and the blank forms differentiated, before real experience can possibly take place. A merely perceptive being—a being having only unrelated feelings and undifferentiated forms—cannot be conceived to be more than potentially intelligent. For experience is a knowledge of objects each of which in itself unites several properties, has parts both extensive and intensive, and is capable of undergoing change without being destroyed; it is a knowledge of objects all of which are connected together as cause and effect, and are in mutual action and reaction. What is wanted to explain experience in its completeness evidently is some combining or integrating principle that is capable of operating in different ways, in accordance with the different kinds of unity to be produced. This universal principle of synthesis is Self-consciousness, and its several modes of activity are the Categories.

The Deduction of the Categories virtually contains all that is essential in the philosophy of Kant, and in this sense its importance cannot be overrated. There is a tendency, however, in commentators on the *Critique*, to employ it as a kind of bugbear to

frighten the reader. No doubt the exposition, as it stands, is by no means a model of clearness, but it is capable of easy comprehension by any one who has once fairly put himself at the critical point of view. It amounts, in brief, to this: that the world of objects is constituted by the synthetical activity of self-conscious Intelligence, which, on the one hand, unites the scattered impressions of sense, under the formal conditions of space and time, into extended and qualified objects, connecting them together as cause and effect and as in reciprocal action; and, on the other hand, combines subjective feelings under the unity of a single self, that exists only in relation to the objects so constituted. Kant proves, therefore, in the first place, that objects exist only in relation to consciousness; secondly, that the self is known as identical only in the process of producing objects; and, thirdly, combining these inferences, that the world of experience, in its two phases of outer and inner, is constituted by Intelligence.

Sensations, let us repeat, are in themselves a mere multiplicity of unconnected units; in other words, there is in them no principle of combination. But combination is essential, if we are to explain the world of objects as known in our experience. Now, Thought or Understanding is usually supposed to be, in the first instance at least, only capable of analysis; it breaks up the concrete object presented to it in perception, and in this way forms abstract or general conceptions. On this view, Thought may combine the properties that have been presented to it by perception into a new unit, but it cannot combine, except on presupposition of a prior analysis. It may manipulate what is supplied to it, but it can supply nothing of itself. Now, if Thought is a purely analytical faculty, or only secondarily synthetical, it evidently cannot constitute objects as such, but can only analyze them if they are given to it by Perception to be analyzed. Synthesis presupposes a prior analysis. It seems, therefore, as if we should not be able to account for experience at all. If there is no capability of synthesis in sensations, or even in sensation combined with the forms of space and time, and if Thought is not synthetic either, how are we to account for the fact that single objects, and objects in connection with each other, alike manifest complexity in unity? Both Perception and Thought being, to all appearance, merely analytic, where is the synthesis to come from? The answer is virtually implied in what

has already been said. It has been shown that objects as in space and time exist only in relation to intelligence, and that Perception but supplies the disconnected materials out of which a world of such objects may be formed. But, as we have discovered Sense to be only an element in knowledge, not a kind of knowledge, we must alter our view of Thought correspondently. That Thought is purely analytic or separative, can be true only upon the presupposition that Perception is synthetic, or, in other words, that individual objects are known in the fulness of their attributes by simple apprehension of a world existing independently of intelligence. This presupposition, however, has been proved to be absurd; a world lying beyond consciousness could never be perceived at all, much less perceived to be made up of individual objects. We must, therefore, completely reverse our conception of the nature of Thought. If Sense does not reveal to us individual objects, but only unrelated perceptions, Thought must be synthetic. Now we can get an intelligible explanation of how experience is possible. The old notion that thinking consists in a mere analysis of objects given in their completeness beforehand is no real explanation, for it does not tell us how we come to know a world of real objects, but assumes that world to be already known. In maintaining all thinking to be analysis or abstraction, it opposes the process of knowing to the process of thinking, and this first leads to sensationalism, and then by an easy descent to scepticism. Thought must therefore be regarded as constituting objects by combining the scattered perceptions given to it. In this way alone can we explain the facts of experience. There can be no possible doubt as to the absolute necessity of synthesis to the existence and connection of real objects; and synthesis, as has been shown, it is vain to attribute to sensation, or to the forms of space and time. The unity of individual objects, and of the whole world of objects, is due to Thought, which puts together the separate differences of sense, and thus constitutes them into individual things, and combinations of individual things. The mere act by which separate objects are formed presupposes the synthetical activity of thought, as operating upon the material of sense, in conformity with spatial and temporal conditions. The world of experience is, however, not a collection of independent objects, but a connected whole, in which each object, and each part of an

object, has a definite place. We have therefore to explain not only the combination of sensations into the unity of single objects, but the connection of all objects of experience in the unity of one world. The fact to be explained—the world of ordinary experience—includes not only things in space and time as complexes of qualities, but things that undergo change without losing their reality, that are joined together by the bond of causality, and that are in mutual action and reaction. And if this immense variety in existence is yet compatible with unity, there must be not only syntheses of Thought, but there must be a single principle that connects together the different modes of synthesis in a perfect unity. This supreme unity is self-conscious Intelligence. Apart from a single identical self, to which by the synthetical activity of Thought all differences may be referred, there could be no unity in experience, and, therefore, no single world of real objects. The unity of the real world of objects must be due to the unity of self-conscious Intelligence.

Thus, it appears that without synthesis there could be no known objects, without various modes of synthesis no world of objects as we know it, and without a single identical Self no unity in that world. Looking at experience from the other side, we can see it to be equally true, and, in fact, already implied in what has been said, that without synthetical acts there could be no consciousness of Self. Isolate the Self, and conceive of it as purely abstract, and it has no difference in it. Intelligence only becomes conscious of itself in the process by which it constitutes objects. A purely perceptive being—a being who had but detached states not connected by a synthesis of thought—would never become conscious of itself. It is, therefore, no explanation to say that we perceive the identity of consciousness by “looking into our own minds,” for we could never discover self to be identical if it were merely given in successive perceptions. The recognition of self as identical presupposes that self is identical in its own nature, and this again implies that it is the sole source of the various kinds of synthesis. A self that existed only in each separate mental state would pass away with the transient state, and hence, as Kant puts it, would be as “many colored and ever changing” as the several states in which it was present. Such a Self would be no identical Self, and, therefore, no Self at all. The

consciousness of self, as in time, is only explicable on presupposition of a self which is not itself in time, but is yet the condition of all synthesis in time; and the consciousness of such a self is possible only in the actual process of combining the manifold of sense under the unity of the categories.

Putting together these two propositions—that real objects only exist in relation to the “synthetical unity of self-consciousness,” and that the consciousness of self as identical is only given in the process by which objects are combined—we reach the inference that the Object is correlative to the Subject, or, as we may also say, that Nature exists only in relation to Intelligence. Thus, we have as completely reversed the old method of explaining experience as Copernicus altered the Ptolemaic conception of the material universe. We have discovered that the world of experience does not act upon a consciousness only fitted passively to receive what is presented to it from without, but that, on the contrary, consciousness is the condition of there being for us any world at all.

In what has gone before there will be found, as I believe, all that is really valuable in Kant's general theory of knowledge. The fundamental principle of the Critical Philosophy, that distinguishes it from all previous systems, is its interpretation of the world of experience as the product of self-conscious intelligence; and if Kant himself was not perfectly true to this principle, there is no doubt that he followed it out as consistently as he could. It is quite true, as a matter of fact, that, after all, he held the world of experience to be distinct from the world as it truly is behind the veil; but the opposition of a noumenal and phenomenal world is seen to be superfluous when it is considered that intelligence cannot go out of itself and establish the existence of that which by definition lies beyond it. The thing-in-itself is simply an illusive fiction which survives for Kant only because he was untrue to the central idea of his philosophy. Other imperfections in Kant's exposition, intimately connected with the hypothesis of an unknown thing-in-itself, will be immediately referred to. Meantime it will help to illustrate the Critical explanation of the facts of experience, if we look at the application of the category of causality to the world as known, and see how Kant endeavored to meet the sceptical doctrine of Hume, that causal connection means

a purely arbitrary sequence of perceptions, not a real connection of objects.

In estimating the validity of Kant's reply to Hume's doctrine of causality, it is essential to bring each into connection with the system of which it forms a part. Now, as has been already pointed out, Hume, in his account of experience, ostensibly admits of no principle of explanation except the immediate feelings of an individual subject, as originally felt or as repeated in a less vivid form. With such materials he cannot possibly build up even a world of experience apparently stable, and hence he is compelled to attribute to feelings more than properly belongs to them. A succession of feelings has no principle of unity in it, and therefore cannot give rise to the unity implied in the experience of a world of objects, all of which are connected together. Hume endeavors to show, not how things are *actually* connected together in a real world—for on his theory there are no things to connect—but how there *seems* to be a connected world of objects. Two things happen to be frequently perceived, the one directly after the other, and, as a natural result, a subjective tendency to associate them together in the order in which they are perceived is created, so that the presence of either in sense or memory calls up the other. Hence, when the one is felt or remembered, there is at the same time a belief in the precedence or sequence of the other. This belief arises from the transference of the vividness of the impression to the idea with which it is associated. The apparent connection of objects or events is only a special sort of transition from one feeling to another. "We remember to have had frequent instances of one species of objects, and also remember that the individuals of another species of objects have always attended them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession with regard to them. Thus we remember to have seen that species of object we call *flame*, and to have felt that species of sensation we call *heat*. We likewise call to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. Without any further ceremony, we call the one cause, and the other effect, and infer the existence of the one from the other." There is, then, according to Hume, no real connection of objects or events, but only an apparent connection produced by custom. The official passage in which the counter-theory of Kant is set forth is the proof of the Second Analogy

of Experience; but as this proof, or, more properly, explanation, of causality presupposes the First Analogy, and, above all, the Deduction of the Categories, and likewise involves great difficulties of interpretation, it seems better to show what reply may be given by an interpretation based upon the spirit of the Critical Philosophy.

It is important to see clearly what Kant has to prove in regard to causality, and what he is entitled to assume. He is not called upon to show, from a mere consideration of the nature of intelligence, that we can determine beforehand *when* to apply the law of causality. Should such an *anticipatio naturæ* be attempted by him, he would be justly chargeable with endeavoring to construct the world independently of experience. Kant commits himself to nothing so absurd. He starts with experience as it exists for us all before the need for any metaphysical justification of it is felt, and he endeavors to prove, from the nature of that experience, what must be presupposed in explanation of it. In the present case, the facts are that we actually believe certain events to be bound together in an irreversible order, while other events are viewed as not connected together in reality at all, or at least not directly connected in the way of cause and effect. There is no dispute whatever as to the fact that we ordinarily do distinguish between a connected series of events and events that have no apparent connection. On this point Reid, Hume, and Kant are perfectly at one. The issue raised does not concern the fact of our belief in causal connection, but the philosophical explanation of the fact. The moment, however, the interpretation of the apparent connection of events begins, a difference emerges. Reid, starting from the misconception that externality in space is equivalent to independence of consciousness, is unable to do more than repeat the fact he ought to explain. We immediately perceive that things are connected together by the bond of cause and effect, and have an "intuitive conviction" that the future will resemble the past. But this view can only maintain its ground so long as we refuse to go beyond the fact of experience in search of an explanation of it. When we try to realize to ourselves what it means, we are straightway led by an inexorable logic to the denial of any real connection in the way of causality. The steps by which this sceptical result is reached have been already indicated. Objects

exist independently of consciousness, and are simply apprehended ; but this means that we only know them through our immediate sensations, and hence in these sensations the asserted connection must be found. Now, so long as reality is not sought for in the nature of intelligence itself, while it cannot be explained from a world that has now disappeared, so far as our theory is concerned, we *must* resolve what at first seemed to be a connection of real events into a constant association of feelings. Hume's theory of causality is but the legitimate result of the separation of reality from intelligence. The reply of Kant must therefore consist in showing that the belief in a real sequence of events is intelligible, and alone intelligible, on the presupposition that reality is constituted by intelligence.

The apparent sequence of real events is, on Hume's theory, but a customary sequence of feelings as they are for the individual subject of them. In answer to this, Kant points out that to deny a real connection of events is to deny all *change*. We never in our ordinary experience suppose that there is before us an instance of causality, unless when there are two events distinguishable from each other. The mere difference of determination, however, does not of itself involve causal connection, or, rather, we do not suppose that a difference in what is presented to us necessarily amounts to such a connection of one event with another as implies that without the first there could not be the second. I can run my eye up and down a house, and in each successive moment have a different perception ; but I do not therefore conclude that the parts perceived in succession are so connected that the one *must* go before and the other come after. Our ordinary notion of real sequence thus implies more than a mere difference of perceptions. What more does it imply ? Evidently, for one thing, that there is not only difference, but difference that exists *in relation to identity*. There must not only be one determination and then another, but each determination must be referred to that which is constant. In other words, real sequence implies that that which changes yet remains the same ; or, the category of causality presupposes the category of substance. Change, however, involves still more than this. Difference of determination and unity of determination—a difference and a unity that mutually presuppose each other—are implied in our ordinary conception of causality ;

but, in addition, *time* is evidently an essential part of the notion. Corresponding to the difference of determination there is time as a series of moments, and corresponding to the unity of determination there is time as one or undifferentiated. These two aspects of time, like the two aspects of the reality, are strictly correlative; there is one time, because there are many moments of time. From this analysis of the conception of causal sequence it is quite evident that it presupposes *synthesis* of a complex kind. There could be no notion of change if there were no synthesis of separate perceptions uniting them into unity. Such synthesis, as has been shown in the Deduction of the Categories, is only possible upon the presupposition that there is a special function of thought by which the union is effected, and this again implies that there is a self-identical intelligence, by which this and other functions of synthesis are made possible. He who denies that there is a real connection of events must virtually deny the possibility of experience. But, while the category of causality must be presupposed as a rule by which separate determinations are capable of being united, it does not follow that we have sufficiently explained a real sequence of events when we have shown that *without* an intellectual synthesis there could be no belief in an irreversible order in events. For, as has been pointed out, by causal connection we mean a change *in time*. There must, therefore, be a synthesis of the moments of time, or rather a differentiation of the one time in its successive moments. Time itself is not Knowable, any more than a category is applicable without the presentation to it of a sensuous material; and hence the synthesis by intelligence of the separate determinations of sensible perception, under the condition of time, and secondarily of space, is the necessary presupposition of our experience of a real sequence of events. Any one, therefore, who denies the actual connection of events must show, first, how there could be any conception of change without a synthesis by intelligence of the detached perceptions of sense; and, secondly, how, apart from a constitutive intelligence, there could be even the consciousness of a succession of feelings in time. That this is impossible may be seen by simply pressing upon Hume the consequences of his theory.

By a real or causal connection of events we do not mean a mere succession of particular appearances in two objects that only exist

in the succession; on the contrary, we suppose that, despite the alteration that takes place in the objects, the objects themselves are permanent. "The sun warms the stone," but the change in the sun and in the stone leaves each unaffected, so far as its identity and permanence are concerned. Hume attempts to explain away the apparent connection of the two objects, but in doing so he really assumes their permanent identity, and this, as has been shown, means that he assumes real change while apparently disproving it. Thus, in the passage above cited, he says: "We remember to have seen that species of objects we call *flame*, and to have felt that species of sensation we call *heat*." Now, here Hume takes advantage of popular language to introduce the notion of permanence, although his aim is to show that permanence in any real sense is a fiction. It is natural to say that we recognize an object to be permanent because we perceive it to exist in successive moments of time. To this realistic view Kant objects that it goes upon the supposition that objects lie ready-made in a space and time independent of consciousness. But this brings us back to the sensationalistic point of view, that objects are known only as they are immediately perceived. We cannot, then, say anything about their existence when they are not perceived, and must, with Locke, limit ourselves to the judgment: "I know this object to exist so long as I perceive it." But, having gone so far, we are compelled to go still farther. If the object can be known to exist only so long as it is perceived, and if for us it exists only in our sensation, we not only cannot affirm it to exist when it is not felt, but we cannot affirm it to exist at all. Hume sees this clearly enough, and expressly asserts, when it suits him, that there is not, on the one hand, an object, and, on the other hand, a sensation, but that the sensation *is* the object. In treating of causality, however, he speaks as if the only point were whether an object exists when it is not felt, whereas the only consistent view for him to take is that no object is ever felt at all. He assumes, first, that there is an object distinct from sensation, and, secondly, that this object persists so long as it is felt. Both assumptions are inconsistent with his exclusion of all relations of thought, and his ostensible reduction of existence to a series of feelings. He is only entitled to affirm that at a certain moment there is one feeling, and at the next moment another feeling. Upon with-

drawal of the notion of a permanent object, there is nothing left but a sequence of feelings, and hence the permanent identity presupposed in the conception of causality disappears. Time, however, the other element implied, seems still to survive. But it is easy to see that, if there is nothing but a series of feelings, there cannot even be a consciousness of these feelings as a series. A self that is only present in each feeling as it arises could not be conscious of feelings as successive, and therefore could never even come to suppose that there are permanent objects, or a series of changes in permanent objects. Such a self, as Kant says, would be as "many-colored" as the feelings; in other words, it would be no self at all, and could have no conscious experience. We are thus brought back to the demonstration of the possibility of experience, as based upon the "synthetical unity of self-consciousness," a demonstration which need not be repeated. Kant's reply to Hume on the question of causality, therefore, amounts briefly to this: causal sequence presupposes the permanent identity of objects; permanent identity implies a sequence in time; temporal succession is possible only if there is a self-identical intelligence, present to all feelings in turn, but identifiable with none of them. Hume cannot deny one of these elements without virtually denying all the rest, and he can give plausibility to his denial of any one of them only by assuming the others; hence, the belief in a real sequence of events cannot be shown to be delusive.¹

KANT'S RELATION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHIC PROGRESS.

READ AT THE KANT CENTENNIAL, AT SARATOGA, JULY 6, 1881, BY JOSIAH ROYCE.

The general law of the progress of human thought is the Law of Parsimony—*i. e.*, of the greatest adaptation of old methods, principles, theories, dogmas, formulæ, terminology, to new needs and to new facts, with the least possible change in the form of these traditional possessions themselves. Even revolutions in

¹ On Hume's doctrine of causality, see Green's *Hume*, pp. 244 ff.